The New Thinking Revisited
Gerard Libaridian Speaks at Princeton University

The presidency of Levon Ter-Petrossian was credited by its advocates for not only ushering Armenia into a new era of independent statehood and multiparty democracy, but also bringing about a revolution in Armenian political thought. In a presentation at Princeton University on 9 May 1998,¹ Gerard J. Libaridian, a leading herald of this "new thinking,"² acknowledged the failure of the political theory and offered an analysis of the reasons for that failure.

Libaridian, who holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles, was an advisor to the president of Armenia from 1991 to September 1997. During that period he served as Senior Advisor for foreign policy and security issues (1994–97), First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993–94), negotiator for the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, and coordinator of conflict-related policy in the Office of the President.

According to Libaridian, Armenia’s foreign policy since independence in 1991 has been based on three principles: (1) security through the maintenance of good relations with all neighbors, (2) preservation of independence, and (3) the integration of Armenia into regional and wider international organizations.

The immediate fear was that "Russia could develop a neoimperial desire and Armenia could lose its independence." That fear drew Armenia in the direction of Iran and Turkey. On the other hand, the desire to have a security system to defend Armenia against "any potential Turkish action" drew Armenia toward Russia.

Armenia did not feel Azerbaijan was a threat. It had no problems with Georgia. Preservation of independence, then, required "some kind of balanced set of relations with the three major neighbors—Russia, Turkey, and Iran."

Relations with Turkey

In this conceptual framework, the Armenian Genocide

was not put up as a problem, as a basis for relations with Turkey. This is very critical because the politicization of the Genocide had served, wittingly or unwittingly, to create the mentality and psychology that Turkey, through its nonrecognition of the Genocide, is likely to repeat it, that Turkey is the eternal enemy. If Turkey is the eternal enemy, then Russia is the eternally necessary friend. And this then creates pressures on your policy of independence.

Armenia set out to establish "normal relations with Turkey without preconditions." This was the crux of the "revolution in Armenian political thought." It "defies most Armenians’ view of their history, of the role Turkey has played and is likely to play in the future."

In practice, however, Turkey "did not accept the same basis of normalization of relations, that is, no preconditions," and although it recognized Armenia’s independence, it has refused to this day to establish diplomatic relations. Turkey made the resolution of the conflict with Azerbaijan a precondition for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia.

Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way

Under the principle of "security through the maintenance of good relations with all neighbors," Armenia was opposed to the progressive escalation and brutalization of the Gharabagh conflict. Libaridian said that until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gharabagh conflict had the nature of a call for an internal administrative change. After independence, "the demand for unification would have been territorial aggrandizement and annexation, and it was the principle of self-determination that became functional, but Ter-Petrossian insisted on the need for a compromise."

Ter-Petrossian believed that the Gharabagh conflict could be resolved by negotiations that were not limited by the invocation of the lofty principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. Such formulaic approaches limited the possibilities of a permanent negotiated settlement. It would be more productive to talk about the actual relations Armenians and Azerbaijanis wanted to have, and then to look at how such ends could be achieved, irrespective of the labels applied—federalism, confederalism, high autonomy, low autonomy, etc. Ter-Petrossian simply insisted that Armenians in Gharabagh should have "their individual, collective, and territorial rights respected, which would not necessarily amount to independence." Indeed, in "a very fundamental positioning," Armenia refused to recognize Gharabagh’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1992.

President Aliyev of Azerbaijan eventually "did come to the same conclusion that a compromise was needed." But every time Azerbaijan

came close to a concession it started thinking we don’t need to do this, maybe we can do this in a different way and not give away any concessions. This was also paralleled by the policy of strangulating Gharabagh and Armenia diplomatically and economically, and bypassing negotiations every time negotiations got to the point something could have been initialed or signed.

Finally, Azerbaijan treated the people of Gharabagh as an enemy, "which was a major paradox because if you claimed that these are your citizens you should be able to sit and talk to them rather than treating them as the enemy and giving them absolutely no reason to trust you."

The International Community

Libaridian found that a number of factors have compromised the credibility of the international community, which has not played a constructive role in establishing stability in the region. In many cases the mediators have obstructed progress, sometimes putting the parties to the conflict "in the position of mediating between the mediators." Indeed, in some cases, international mediators disrupted agreements, in line with their own agendas. Libaridian stated that there have been at least two successful Russian attempts to disrupt an agreement, one successful American attempt, and one Turkish—not to mention the unsuccessful ones.

The question of pipelines and oil has been the occasion for bullying and intimidation, which has undermined "the confidence and trust of people in Gharabagh and Armenia."

Libaridian said that there was an effort by the West to create an East-West axis—Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian states—and "that would appear as an attempt to divide Russia from Armenia, Russia from Iran, isolate Russia, encircle Russia, and it becomes a very dangerous thing for Russia."

United States encouragement of Turkey to play a very active role, given that Turkey has its own agenda in the region, translated into full support of the Azerbaijani position. That made "the United States position very suspect and counterproductive in the negotiations."

The Fall Of Ter-Petrossian

By 1996 it was clear that Turkey would not establish normal diplomatic relations with Armenia and would continue its unqualified support for Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrossian embarked on two last-ditch efforts to reach agreements with Turkey and Azerbaijan that involved mutual compromise. Emboldened by oil contracts, however, Azerbaijan stopped negotiating and went to the OSCE summit with a proposal that would predetermine the outcome of the negotiations. Ter-Petrossian vetoed it.

Turkey steadfastly refused even to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. It based its policies "on ethnic affinities—unlike Iran which based its relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia on strategic and state policy considerations." The two thrusts failed for Ter-Petrossian.

Ultimately, "Ter-Petrossian had nothing to show for the revolutionary thinking he had displayed." There were no concessions from Azerbaijan; there was no help from Turkey; no help from the international community. "Seven years of attempts to normalize, to rule out preconditions, failed, and the thinking reemerged in Armenia that Turkey is and may be in fact the eternal enemy and Ter-Petrossian was wrong."

Armenia’s foreign policy under Ter-Petrossian was not based on conflict resolution, Libaridian said. Now another kind of thinking predominates, in which "the conflict is at the center of foreign policy." The new foreign minister has started to talk about the Genocide as part of the agenda in relations with the Turkish state.

"Toward the end, the debate in the higher circles of Gharabagh and Armenia was [about] whether it was possible to have serious economic growth and a rise in the standard of living without resolving the conflict. Mr. Ter-Petrossian thought not. Mr. Kocharian thought yes. Mr. Kocharian is the president today."

Libaridian concluded by warning that if Turkey, Azerbaijan, and members of the international community fail to reassess their negotiating positions and "to avoid the mistakes of the past, this shift of emphasis, can turn out to be a shift of strategic thinking as well."

Ara Sarafian

Notes

¹ The round table conference, entitled "Conflict in the Caucasus: Yesterday and Today," was funded by the Münir Ertegün Foundation of the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University. There were nine participants: John Colarusso, Uli Schamiloglu, Lev Dzugaev, Alan Kasaev, Vadim Ogoev, Gerard Libaridian, Robin Bhatty, Charles Fairbanks, Magommedkhan Magommedkhanov, and Paul Goble.

² In 1991, Libaridian edited an influential collection of tracts advocating the "new thinking": Armenia at the Crossroads (Watertown, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1991).

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